In this paper, we shed light on the selection of the beneciaries from the French competitiveness cluster policy which was launched in 2005 and extended to 2012. We disentangle the selection and self-selection eects, as emphasized in the theoretical literature on regional and industrial policy. Our main conclusion is that winners were (self-)selected at both steps of the procedure, and that this holds for the three cluster types: worldwide clusters, potentially worldwide clusters and national clusters. We thus provide a methodology which allows us to contrast the eective outcomes of the selection process and the ocial objectives of cluster policies in terms of targeting, and which thus helps in their econometric evaluation.
Introduction
Cluster initiatives are popular among policy makers, based on externality and localized growth arguments in the economic literature, suggesting that subsidies for local networks 1 Clustering may encourage the mutualization of some production costs and the diusion of knowledge: Rosenthal and Strange (2004) survey the empirical literature on agglomeration externalities and conrm the economic gains linked to the spatial concentration of production.
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In parallel with the link between public policy and the academic literature, cluster policies are increasingly being econometrically evaluated: Falck et al. (2010) use rmlevel data to evaluate a cluster policy introduced in Bavaria in 1999, Engel et al. (2011) focus on two German cluster initiatives in the biotechnology industry, Nishimura and Okamuro (2011) Analyzing the outcome of the selection of beneciaries is important for at least three reasons. First, by assessing which locations and rms have been subsidized, we can compare the revealed objectives of the policy to the ocial ones that were announced with the implementation of the policy. Second, when the revealed and ocial objectives of the policy are not the same, the careful assessment of the stage of the selection process at which the discrepancy came about may help to improve policy design. This contributes to the debate over the political economy of rm and region targeting. A number of papers have emphasized that traditional industrial policies very often pick losers, i.e. rms in declining sectors or areas (Beason and Weinstein, 1996; Martin et al., 2011b) ; it is however still unclear whether this reects the preferences of policy makers (Corden, 1974; Krueger, 1990) , the capture of governments by particular rms (Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2007) or the design of the policies themselves (Baldwin and Okubo, 2006) . Finally, the analysis of the selection process aids the econometric evaluation of the policy, by shedding light 1 Ocial documents accompanying cluster initiatives such as the competitiveness clusters in France, the Kompetenznetze in Germany or the clusters in the Spanish Basque country, explicitly or impli-self-selection. In July 2005, the government chose the subsidized competitiveness clusters from the 105 applications received. Firms then joined the competitiveness clusters by becoming members of the organization managing the cluster (which was generally an association). The rst step hence selects industry-area pairs revealing the government's selection among applicants, while rms then self-select into the chosen competitiveness clusters.
For example, a biotech cluster was selected in the vicinity of Lyon (Lyon Biopole). 28
rms then became active members of this cluster in 2006. Member rms could apply for R&D tenders specically oriented to labeled competitiveness clusters.
We follow closely the selection procedure of the French competitiveness clusters in order to highlight the dierent types of selection at work. We rst ask how the location of clusters was chosen: Is there any evidence, within a given sector, that selected locations contain more ecient rms on average? Not all of the rms in a selected sector-location pair became members of the organization managing the cluster and applied for subsidies.
We thus focus in a second step on the selection of rms within the subsidized clusters, and check whether cluster-member rms are more ecient than other rms in the same sectorlocation. This second stage will help us to understand the kind of self-selection generated by the design of the competitiveness clusters. Last, we see whether cluster-member rms
show an export premium once their individual characteristics (e.g. productivity) have been controlled for. Any such premium would suggest that rm geographical clustering adds to the rm-specic competitive advantage.
The goal of the French cluster policy is to promote innovation through increased collaborations between rms, private research centres and universities, and to strengthen the competitiveness of French products on international markets. Firm-level eciency and competitiveness have many interdependent dimensions. As this policy aims to promote competitiveness in a context of increasing international competition, we choose to focus on rm export performance and productivity before they received public support.
Information on alternative direct rm-level measures of innovation (R&D expenditures, patents etc.) is not exhaustive in France, and the coverage of rm-level export data is much better. We also believe that productivity and export performance capture dierences between rms regarding innovation, as a number of pieces of work have shown that innovation, productivity and exports are closely related. Aw et al. (2011) use Taiwanese data to show that an expansion of the export market increases both the probability of exporting and R&D investment, generating within-plant productivity gains. Cassiman and Golovko (2011) nd in Spanish data that the positive association between productivity and exports can be largely explained by rms' earlier innovation decisions. Iacovone and Javorcik (2012) show that Mexican rms increase the quality of their products before entering export markets, and Van Beveren and Vandenbussche (2010) use Belgian data to show that rms self-select into innovation activities, anticipating entry into foreign markets.
Three categories of clusters were dened by the French government in 2005, reecting dierences in terms of expected scope. Worldwide clusters are at the top of this ranking, followed by potentially worldwide clusters and national clusters. Our main conclusion is that the two-step selection procedure led the public authorities to favor better-performing places and rms in a given sector. Using 2004 export performance as an eciency measure, we nd that in a given sector, public authorities selected locations with better-performing rms on average, compared to rms in the same sector located in other regions. Moreover, within a given chosen sector-location, the rms that actively joined (self-selected in) the competitiveness cluster have better export performance and higher productivity than those that did not. Our results reassuringly show that the three cluster categories group together dierent types of rms: locations and rms in worldwide competitiveness clusters have better performance than those in potentially worldwide clusters, and the latter perform better than those in national clusters. We underline that picking winners holds especially for national clusters, where rm heterogeneity is the greatest. We only observe an export premium, after controlling for individual characteristics such as size and productivity, for rms in national clusters.
This paper does not aim to be normative. It is actually dicult to know how to target cluster policies. Industrial policies are criticized by economists on the grounds that they often help declining sectors or rms, impeding or delaying the reallocations of activities that would be benecial for aggregate productivity (see Criscuolo et al., 2012) . However, this does not necessarily mean that public authorities should help always winners, i.e.
regions or rms that already perform well, since it is not obvious that they will be more aected in terms of performance by public intervention than regions or rms which are lagging. In this paper, we rather try to provide a methodology that could be reproduced for the analysis of selection in industrial policies that are based on a two-step procedure, such as the French competitiveness clusters considered here.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briey discusses the existing literature, and the data are described in Section 3. Section 4 looks at whether the selected clusters exhibit on average an export premium in their sector. Section 5 then asks whether the rms selected to join the clusters have an export premium, but without controlling for their individual characteristics. These individual characteristics are controlled for in Section 6. Last, Section 7 concludes.
Literature
There are two theoretical elements in the discussion of policies subsidizing rms and regions. The main question asked by economists addresses the economic mechanisms underlying the clustering of economic activity: this is briey reviewed in the rst part of this section. The second element, which is linked to the development from traditional industrial and regional policy to modern cluster policy, is targeting. There are three ways of addressing this issue: How is the selection? How could it be? And how should it be?
We will concentrate on the positive aspect of selection, i.e. the rst question, although
we briey mention normative aspects in the paper's introduction. We thus review below the positive results regarding selection in dierent theoretical frameworks. Porter (1998 Porter ( , 2000 , which provides a modern denition of agglomeration, based on a theoretical tool, the competitive diamond. This explains local competitive advantage by the relationships linking demand conditions, factor (supply) conditions, related and supporting industries and the context for rm strategy and rivalry. Martin and Sunley (2003) however note that this concept of clusters is too vague to be helpful. As the causal relationship between the dierent elements of the diamond is unclear, it is dicult to know, using this theoretical tool, which exact mechanisms drive local growth, and so to determine the relevant cluster policies. In addition, Duranton et al. (2011) and Duranton (2011) both argue that important elements, such as labor mobility or land markets, are crucial for the analysis of cluster dynamics but are absent from this representation. Porter (2000) considers that any intervention which stimulates one element of the diamond is good, since it will feed back on all of the other elements. Porter cites, amongst others, subsidies aiming at increasing the cluster size, the creation of specialized education programs, and transport infrastructure. Place-based policies are however the subject of considerable controversy in the literature (see Barca et al., 2012) . Duranton et al. (2010) disagree with Porter and note that cluster policies should be justied by the existence of market failures or externalities which would not be internalized by economic agents without some public intervention. As such, acknowledging the benets from clusters does not suce to make the case for cluster policies. Duranton et al. (2010) also emphasize that cluster policies are characterized by sizeable information asymmetries which could undermine their eciency. Existing work generally nds at most a modest and short-run positive impact of cluster policies (see Engel et al., 2011; Martin et al. , 2011b; Nishimura and Okamuro, 2011; Viladecans-Marsal and Arauzo-Carod, 2011 4 In particular, the lack of cooperation between universities, research centers and industrial rms, and the insucient number of medium-sized exporters, have often been evoked as the market failures behind this poor export performance, notably with respect to their German counterparts. Clustering could help in this respect.
Clusters and cluster policies
5 On the one hand, it could encourage innovation and quality upgrading, thus increasing the competitiveness of French products; on the other hand, it could help to reduce the xed export costs emphasized in the new trade theory (Melitz, 2003) . While the bulk of these costs are specic to the rm, some may be shared, in particular when it comes to collecting information on remote or uneasy markets. The results in Koenig et al. (2010 and 2011) conrm the existence of such local export spillovers in France, which are stronger for more dicult to access markets. declining sectors or weaker regions (see Beason and Weinstein, 1996 and Martin et al., 2011b) . The theoretical literature has proposed a number of explanations of governments' apparent diculty to pick winners.
A rst strand of the literature focuses on the social planner's welfare function. Corden (1974) suggests that revenue losses are assigned a higher weight in the social planners' welfare function than are revenue gains. Krueger (1990) justies this alleged bias of governments in favor of losers by individual psychological traits: there is an identity bias, so that people care more about people they know than about others; in that sense, it is easier to feel empathy for people who lose their jobs, as they can be clearly identied, 4 See http://competitivite.gouv.fr/la-mise-en-oeuvre-de-la-politique-des-poles-depuis-2005/les-enjeuxde-la-politique-des-poles-477.html.
than for the potential beneciaries of future jobs, who are unknown. Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) propose an alternative model, in which it is not the governments that pick losers but rather the losers who capture industrial policies.
They show that in the presence of sunk entry costs, the rents created by lobbying are higher in declining industries, due to lower competition there as compared to expanding industries. Firms operating in declining industries thus have greater incentives to lobby for subsidies.
Recent work has introduced rm heterogeneity in lobbying models in order to understand which rms, within a sector, have the greatest incentives to lobby. Bombardini (2008) in particular shows that in the presence of xed costs linked to lobbying activities, larger rms will be more likely to engage in lobbying, and nds empirical support for her model in US data. This literature contrasts with the picking losers analyses: as lobbying is costly, it does not necessarily follow that only poorly-performing rms will benet from protection and industrial policy. This analysis seems particularly relevant in the case of the French competitiveness clusters. Participating can be protable, but it is also costly. In order to obtain R&D subsidies, rms in clusters must apply to calls for tender which are specically dedicated to them. There are thus application forms to ll in, and administrative monitoring to undertake in the case of success, which could produce self-selection by larger or better-performing rms in competitiveness clusters.
The type of incentives provided by regional or industrial policy might also shape the pool of beneciaries: Baldwin and Okubo (2006) use a new economic geography model with heterogeneous rms to show for example that, starting from a core-periphery situation, a per-rm subsidy aimed at encouraging production in the periphery tends to attract the least-ecient rms. These are the rms that have the least to lose from leaving the core region, since they benet the least from agglomeration economies and suer the most from the tougher competition there. Conversely, Baldwin and Okubo (2009) show that if incentives take the form of lower taxes, big rms, who pay more tax in absolute terms, may have a greater incentive to move. In the same vein, Okubo (2012) shows that a subsidy proportional to prots can induce the relocation of high-productivity rms to the periphery. These results can shed light on the dierent outcomes from (self )-selection in the two French cluster policies. The Local Productive Systems, evaluated by Martin et al. (2011b) , consisted of a small one-shot subsidy aimed at nancing any collaborative projects between rms. The competitiveness clusters policy is very dierent, since most of the incentives consist of R&D subsidies for projects involving several rms and labs, and the rms engaged in R&D activities are generally more productive.
In the following, we do not deal with the exact mechanisms that drive selection into competitiveness clusters, as they are unobserved. We thus do not directly address the questions of lobbying, policy-makers' preferences or connections between policy-makers and cluster managers etc. We instead focus on the outcome of selection, taking advantage of the two-step procedure to uncover both selection and self-selection eects. The literature cited above is however a useful background to guide the interpretation of the results we obtain.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
Data
We appeal to three main data sources. First, we rely on individual exports as recorded by French customs. Each year, the data list the exports of all rms located in France, 7 at the 8-digit level of the CN8 product classication, comprising over 10,000 dierent product lines.
8 Our analysis evaluates the performance of rms prior to the implementation of the competitiveness clusters policy in 2005, using trade data for the year 2004. In most estimations, we capture rm eciency by the value and volume of exports at the rm-level aggregated over all products and destinations.
The second data source is the Annual Business Surveys (ABS) 9 , which provide rmlevel balance sheet data such as employment, capital, and value-added etc. We use ABS data restricted to manufacturing rms, and thus do not cover services and agrifood industries. These data give information on rm productivity. This dataset is however restricted 7 More precisely, Customs record exports at the company level. Companies may belong to groups. We will however use the term rms for the sake of simplicity. We ensure that our results are robust when controlling for ownership. to rms with over 20 employees.
Last, we need to know which rm belongs to which cluster. The French Ministry of Finance provided us the list of the 4,552 rm members of competitiveness clusters in 2006. These rms had not necessarily received R&D subsidies at that time; they were only eligible, as members of competitiveness clusters, to apply to national R&D tenders specically aimed at competitiveness cluster rms. This dataset also contains information on the number of employees by rm.
The process of matching rms in France is straightforward, as each rm has a unique identier (SIREN) that is the same across the dierent datasets. The combination of the three datasets nevertheless raises a number of issues. First, the ABS contain both single and multi-plant rms. In the latter case, the total employment in the ABS is that for the rm as a whole. Second, not all rms export goods: some may export services and some
may not export at all, while exports of services are not recorded by Customs. Last, small exporters, with fewer than 20 employees, are not covered by the ABS, even if they export goods. Out of the 111,960 exporting rms in the Customs dataset for the year 2004, 13,587 appear in the manufacturing ABS, of which 1,010 belong to at least one cluster.
Starting from a total of 2,242 exporters in all the clusters, these restrictions imply the loss of half of the exporters identied as belonging to a cluster. We thus proceed with dierent samples corresponding to dierent combinations of the restrictions. We rst use the whole set of rms. Then, in order to control for productivity and size, we restrict the sample to the rms with more than 20 employees (which hence appear in the ABS); we do however check that results are not aected by the change in the estimation sample.
Finally, we make sure that our results continue to hold when we control for the number of plants, and thus restrict the sample to single-plant rms.
For each rm and year, we compute the number of exported products and the number of destination countries. We use the CEPII geographic database 10 to obtain the distance between France and each destination country, and compute the weighted average distance of the rm's destination countries (weighting the distance to each country by the share of the country in the rm's total exports). in clusters based on the share of groups with at least one rm engaged in a cluster. The concentration of observations remains striking when we control for ownership: Table (2) displays the same information as Table (1), with members of competitiveness clusters now being represented through the group to which they belong. This shows that groups involved in clusters account for 10.94% of French exporting groups, but for 75.01% of their exports. In the rst percentile of groups ordered according to their exported value, these percentages are respectively 86% and 93.51%.
As noted above, clusters were grouped by public authorities into three categories, , with an average size of 2,500 employees (these were hence large rms). Under half of these rms were direct exporters (the smallest rms may use intermediaries to export, however we can not see this in the database). Lyon biopole, the biotech cluster mentioned above, is the smallest cluster in this rst category, with 28 rms involved, 14 of which export goods. In the category 2 clusters, rms are of similar size (2,400 employees on average), and the clusters are smaller (90 rms on average). Around 40% of the rms here are exporters and the smallest cluster, Innovations thérapeutiques, comprises 29 rms (involved in the health sector). The third category of clusters is very heterogeneous.
It consists of small clusters oriented toward innovation (such as innovative materials (MIPI), 18 rms) as well as large clusters for which the innovative orientation is less obvious (427 rms in the meat sector Viandes et produits carnés). As such, average rm size is not very informative in this latter group. The export orientation of national competitiveness clusters turns out to be greater than that of the potentially worldwide competitiveness clusters and worldwide competitiveness clusters: the share of exporting rms is respectively 55%, 40% and 47%. This gure is even 100% and 89% respectively for the clusters aquatic products and innovative materials (MIPI).
Overall, competitiveness clusters are fairly outward-oriented, as the share of exporters in the whole population of French rms is only around 4%. When we restrict our attention to rms that are present in the manufacturing ABS (around 25% of rms involved in competitiveness clusters are present in the ABS), this ratio rises further to 90%, which is much higher than the average in the ABS sample (69% of ABS rms are exporters). Note that some rms, in worldwide clusters in particular, may belong to groups which serve foreign markets by their direct presence, via FDI rather than exports. national tenders specically set up for the competitiveness clusters members. We evaluate the selection of sector-location pairs using rm data, some of which are in and some out of the selected pairs. We compare performance of the sector-locations beneting from the policy to that of other pairs in the same sector which were not chosen.
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We dene the locations included in the clusters as all of the administrative départe-ments in which there is at least one rm belonging to a selected cluster (based on the list of members of competitiveness clusters obtained from the Ministry of Industry). Symmetrically, an industry, dened at the 3-digit level of the French Nomenclature of Activities (NAF), is said to be represented in French competitiveness clusters when one cluster member belongs to this industry. Some competitiveness clusters group rms pertaining to several industries and/or several départements. In our data, a competitiveness cluster can thus correspond to several sector-location pairs. Performance is assessed in terms of exports and productivity.
We dene the average performanceȳ of location r in sector s as follows:
11 Only 3,635 sector-location pairs have positive exports out of a potential universe of 8,178 (94 départe-ments times 87 3-digit NAF sectors.). As 12 of the 87 3-digit sectors have no rms selected in a cluster, where y is a performance index, I sr the set of rms i belonging to sector s in location r and s isr the share of rm i in total exports originating from sector-location pair sr.
The aim of this exercise is to identify any dierences between locations with and without competitiveness clusters. We thus compare, within a given sector, the average performance of rms in French départements with the policy to that of rms in départe-ments without it. In the rst step of the analysis we thus estimate the following:
where WCC sr , PWCC sr and NCC sr are dummies for at least one rm in sector s and dé-partement r belonging to a Wordwide, Potentially Worldwide or National competitiveness We expect the performance of the biotech-Rhône pair to be higher than any other biotechlocation pair. We thus look for a locational advantage of Lyon in this sector, i.e. greater eciency in producing and exporting biotech products.
The results of the estimations are shown in Table ( 3). We use a cross section for year 2004, which is one year prior to the implementation of the policy. As some sector-location at least one Potentially Worldwide cluster and 382 in at least one National cluster as their best category.
The estimated coecients in the rst column of Table ( 3) show that rms in the three types of clusters do export more than rms in the same 3-digit sector but other départements. This premium is the largest for Worldwide clusters. More generally, we observe that the price-quality range of the exported products, the diversication of products, the diversication of markets, and the ability to export to remote markets are greater on average, for a given 3-digit sector, in the selected locations. The last column further shows that average productivity (of a given 3-digit sector) is greater in locations with a cluster.
13 It is thus likely that the better export performance 13 Location-sector average productivity is calculated based on rm-level Total Factor Productivity (TFP), from the GMM estimation of a production function. See Section 6 for more details.
in the selected locations is explained by higher productivity.
These rst results then show that the public authorities selected locations which performed well in the sectors prioritized. In a given sector, rms located in the départements with a selected cluster performed on average better than did rms in the same sector located in other départements.
Three dierent mechanisms may explain this premium. First, a selection eect implies that only the best-performing rms survive in clusters, due to the tougher competition in these denser areas (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008) . Second, this selection eect could be reinforced by spatial sorting. In a model with heterogeneous rms, Baldwin and Okubo (2006) show that when rms relocate, the more productive ones will be the rst to move from the periphery to the core. Finally, local natural advantages and agglomeration economies, which are more intense in clusters, can also explain why cluster rms have a productive advantage over non-cluster rms. Which eect dominates? Combes et al. (2008) show that spatial sorting is important for workers. However, for rms, Combes et al. (2012) nd that the productivity dierences between French cities cannot be explained by selection. This suggests an important role for agglomeration economies and natural advantages to explain rm productivity dierences across regions. This is consistent with work showing that an important determinant of rms' location decisions is the number of rms already located in the region (Crozet et al., 2004, for France; Devereux et al., 2007, for the UK).
14 We thus conclude that the ex ante productivity premium in French competitiveness clusters mainly reects better endowments and greater agglomeration economies in the targeted areas. However, apart from this ex ante premium, the policy might also generate ex post rm relocations, with some rms moving to the targeted areas in order to benet from the R&D subsidies oered. Viladecans-Marsal and Arauzo-Carod (2011) Our results so far have shown that, within a given sector, the Competitiveness cluster policy targeted the best-performing locations. However, this does not prove that these clusters ultimately grouped together the champions in the selected sectors. The rms themselves could decide whether to participate in a cluster, and the following section explores the eectiveness of this self-selection by rms.
Firms in clusters have better export performance
This section moves from average sector-location to rm-level performance. We concentrate on exporting rms (around 50% of cluster rms are exporters) and ask whether, conditional on exporting, selected rms in the selected clusters perform on average better than do rms outside the clusters. We thus estimate the same regression as Equation 2, but now at the rm-level. The diculty is that exports are declared by rms, not by plants. It is thus dicult to control for location-specic variables. Moreover, some rms appear in a number of dierent clusters. We thus include a dummy variable for multicluster rms to reect this and control for the potentially particular premium of these rms. Table 4 . There are 111,960 observations. The coecient on the cluster dummy in column 1, estimated without any other controls, suggests clear-cut conclusion: rms participating in clusters exported more than did others before entering the competitiveness clusters. From column 2 onwards we account for the endogenous selection of sectors by the competitiveness cluster policy, via sector xed eects. The Customs database allows us to identify each rm's sector at the HS2 level.
The results for rm-level export values in 2004 are presented in
16 Even after controlling for sector xed eects, the cluster dummy continues to attract a positive signicant coecient. This indicates that, within a given sector, competitiveness cluster rms export on average 12.5 [exp(2.526)] times more than do other rms. In column 3, the problem of multi-cluster rms is tackled: the estimated coecient on the cluster dummy is slightly reduced, however the story remains basically unchanged. Columns 4 and 5 address the heterogeneity between the three categories of clusters. Column 4 lists the results allowing each cluster category to have dierent coecients. In column 5, we further control for multi-cluster rms. Overall, the results
show that, for a given sector, cluster rms export more than non-participating rms.
The premium associated with clusters ranges from around 1000% for potentially worldwide clusters to 2000% for worldwide clusters, with an extra-premium for multi-clustered rms. The total value of exports is however only one basic measure of export performance.
We now use the extra information available in the customs data to better characterize export performance. Four variables are considered: the unit value (a proxy for prices and quality), product diversication (the number of dierent products exported by a rm), market diversication (the number of destinations to which the rm ships), and the ability to export to more remote markets (the average distance from France to the destination countries). On average, cluster rms export more, and their products have higher price-quality; they also have a larger portfolio of exported products, shipped to a wider set of markets. These general results are however fairly heterogeneous across the dierent cluster types.
In National clusters, rms export more, but the quality premium is lower compared to Worldwide clusters. On the other hand, rms in Worldwide clusters export many more products to many more destinations than do rms in the other cluster types. There is moreover a premium for multi-cluster rms in each of these dimensions. Last, the premium of rms in National clusters is negative in terms of exporting to remote markets: rms in this group do not appear to be global players.
To summarize, these results show that subsidized rms in the French competitiveness clusters policy had better export performance than other rms before the implementation of the policy: the French authorities subsidized rms that had an ex ante export premium, which is a proxy for eciency. The French authorities thus seem to have managed, through the two-stage selection process (sector-location pairs and then rms), to extract information on winners. The next section explores whether this information on the export premium goes beyond rm observable characteristics (such as productivity and size), i.e.
whether the geographical clustering of rms as such already adds ex ante to the rmspecic premium.
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Controlling for individual characteristics eliminates the competitiveness premium
The previous section demonstrated that rms participating in competitiveness clusters perform overall better than do other rms. The recent theoretical literature on rm heterogeneity stresses that rms with greater eciency also have better export performance.
The export premium observed for rms in clusters thus might simply reect selection bias:
rms in clusters are just the most productive ones. We would thus like to check whether we still observe an export premium for rms in clusters once their individual characteristics have been controlled for. To answer this question, we use the manufacturing ABS dataset and introduce controls for the individual rm characteristics. Our sample is reduced to 13,857 exporting rms, of which 1,010 belong to a competitiveness cluster. To calculate rm-level total factor productivity, we estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function. We then require information on rm value-added, number of employees and capital; we consequently limit our exercise to the 13,510 exporting rms present in the ABS, which may or may not be cluster members for which the relevant data is available. The estimation of production functions is subject to a number of drawbacks that we address via GMM estimation, following Griliches and Mairesse (1996) and Bond (2002) (see the Appendix). Table ( A-2) in the Appendix replicates the results of Table (5) using this restricted sample. The estimates conrm that the rms subsidized in the French competitiveness clusters had better export performance, such as greater export value and unit value, more exported products and more numerous and more remote export destinations, than did the other exporters present in the ABS.
For the sake of clarity we rst focus on the export value. We regress the log value of rm exports in the ABS, and we then compare our previous results to those obtained with this new sample comprising 13,510 observations. Column 1 of Table (6) controls for rm size and productivity. Fixed eects at the 3-digit level are included in columns 2 to 5. Fixed eects at the département /2-digit sector and at the département /3-digit sector are respectively introduced in columns 6 and 7. Standard errors are clustered at the 3-digit level in columns 1 to 5, at the département /2-digit level in column 6, and at the département /3-digit level in column 7. Note: Fixed eects at the 3-digit level are introduced in columns 2 to 5. Fixed eects at the dé-partement/NAF2 digit and at the département/3-digit industry are respectively introduced in columns 6 and 7. Standard errors are clustered at the 3-digit level from column 1 to 5, at the département/NAF2-digit level in column 6 and at the département/3-digit level in column 7.
The results in the previous section continue to hold in column 1, but the size of the competitiveness cluster premium is considerably reduced (now 66% as opposed to 1700%). This comes as no surprise since the restriction of the analysis to ABS rms means that we consider larger rms, for which the dispersion of export performance may be more limited. Moreover, we now control for rm size and productivity: the lower export premium shows that larger and more productive rms self-selected into competitiveness clusters. Even so, after controlling for size and productivity, we still observe an export-value premium for competitiveness cluster rms. When the rm's sector is controlled for in column 2, this premium shrinks to 40%, and is further reduced in column 3 after controlling for multi-cluster rms. More interestingly, columns 4 to 7 reveal that the general premium measured for competitiveness cluster rms is due to a composition eect. We decompose the dummy competitiveness cluster into three dierent dummies depending on cluster type: only National clusters contribute positively and signicantly to the export premium of competitiveness cluster rms.
We thus conclude that competitiveness clusters simply group together the most efcient rms in the selected sector. After controlling for size and productivity, nothing is left in terms of a competitive premium, with the noticeable exception of National clusters.
17 In this latter cluster type, rms do exhibit an export premium beyond their individual characteristics. Table ( Regarding the other dimensions of rm-level performance, Table 7 shows that rms in National clusters also exhibit a productivity premium compared to rms in the same sector-department that are not cluster members. All three categories have a premium in terms of unit-value, which is particularly large for Worldwide competitiveness clusters.
This shows that rms in competitiveness clusters produce and export higher-quality goods than do non-cluster rms in the same sector-département. No signicant premium is found 17 Results available upon request show that this nding is robust to the exclusion of multi-plant rms from the sample. To uncover the determinants of this self selection process, we also used logit estimation to explain whether a rm participates in a National cluster based on its individual characteristics.
The results show that self-selected rms are larger, probably due to the sunk costs associated with the application process, or due to better access to information and networking. These rms are also more productive and more export-oriented. Being a member of a domestic group increases the probability of entering into a cluster. for the other dimensions of export performance once rm size, productivity and presence in more than one cluster is taken into account.
It should be noted that rms are not necessarily nancially independent.
18 They often belong to a group where decisions made at the headquarters level aect the individual export performance of aliates. The nationality of the group is also likely to aect rm performance. Last, rms can be single-or multi-plant. If these variables are correlated with competitiveness cluster membership, then they could be behind the observed premium for National clusters. We try to control for the dierent types of selection by merging our data with information on the (domestic and international) nancial linkages between rms. These come from the LIFI database, constructed by the French National Institute for Statistics. We check in Table ( A-4) in the Appendix whether we continue to see an export performance premium for National clusters only after controlling for these dimensions.
19 The results, in column 5 onwards of this Tables (A-5 ) and (A-6)).
Conclusion
The results in this paper have shown that despite the considerable number of clusters subsidized by the French competitiveness cluster policy, the process was actually rather selective: only 2% of manufacturing exporters are members of a competitiveness cluster.
This nal tally results from the selection of clusters (sector-location couples) by the national authorities, and then the self-selection of individual rms as cluster members in order to apply for the subsidies available to the selected clusters.
The empirical outcome of this two-stage process is clear. The rst stage yields clusters of rms that perform on average better within their sector at the national level. The second stage induced rms which performed better than others in the same sector-location pair to self-select as cluster members. This is true for all three cluster types. However, with the exception of National clusters, the export premia are fully explained by individual rm characteristics: the geographical clustering of rms as such does not add anything to the ex ante premium for the other cluster categories. In the rst two cluster categories, national champions were then (self )-selected according to their size and productivity.
They however had no ex ante export premium beyond these individual characteristics (except for quality, proxied by export unit value). For National clusters, which were the most heterogeneous, things are rather dierent. Firms in these clusters export more than do others, even after controlling for size and productivity. This could mean that rms in National clusters benet from export spillovers or have a specic ability, beyond individual productivity or size, that makes them future potential champions.
We believe that this paper provides an interesting methodology that could be replicated to evaluate cluster policies and more generally, industrial policies with geographical scope based on calls for tender. It also opens up avenues for future research. In particular,
whether the subsidy type (R&D versus employment incentives, big versus small moneless export-oriented, while the eect for groups focused on international markets is the opposite.
tary subsidies etc.) plays a role in the self-selection of rms remains an open question.
Comparative work may well help in this respect.
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Appendix: The estimation of production functions Two main issues arise when estimating production functions:
• Unobserved heterogeneity : Some characteristics, unobserved by the econometrician, may be related to both rm value added and input levels chosen by the rm. Consequently, the OLS estimation of input elasticities are potentially biased, as the endogenous variables will partly capture the eect of unobserved characteristics.
For example, less risk-averse rms may distort their labor-capital mix in a particular way, have dierent innovation strategies and also seek more risky (and potentially more protable) markets. Not taking rm xed characteristics into account potentially biases the estimation of returns to capital and labour.
• Simultaneity : At the beginning of the year, the rm may anticipate a positive (or negative) economic shock and consequently decide on the amount of capital and labor to use. From an econometric point of view, there is possible reverse causality:
the amount of capital and labour are determined by rm decisions regarding the level of output, rather than the opposite.
To solve both of these issues, we use an instrumental variables approach. The method follows Bond (2002) and Griliches and Mairesse (1995) : we start by taking rst-dierences of each variable, to address unobserved heterogeneity. We then instrument the rstdierenced independent variables by their level at time t − 2. The underlying econometric assumption is that the idiosyncratic shock at time t − 2 is orthogonal to the dierence in the shocks in t and t − 1. Under this assumption, the instruments are exogenous. We nd Note: Fixed eects at the 3-digit level are introduced in columns 2 to 5. Fixed eects at the départe-ment /NAF2-digit and at the département /3-digit industry are respectively introduced in columns 6 and 7. Standard errors are clustered at the 3-digit level in columns 1 to 5, at the département /NAF2-digit level in column 6, and at the département/3-digit level in column 7. 
